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Proactive Eavesdropping via Cognitive Jamming in
Fading Channels
Jie Xu, Lingjie Duan, and Rui Zhang
Abstract—To enhance the national security, there is a growing
need for authorized parties to legitimately monitor suspicious
communication links for preventing intended crimes and terror
attacks. In this paper, we propose a new wireless information
surveillance paradigm by investigating a scenario where a le-
gitimate monitor aims to intercept a suspicious wireless link
over fading channels. The legitimate monitor can successfully
eavesdrop (decode) the information of the suspicious link at each
fading state only when its achievable data rate is no smaller
than that at the suspicious receiver. We propose a new approach,
namely proactive eavesdropping via cognitive jamming, in which
the legitimate monitor purposely jams the receiver in a full-
duplex mode so as to change the suspicious communication
(e.g., to a smaller data rate) for overhearing more efficiently.
By assuming perfect self-interference (SI) cancelation (SIC) and
global channel state information (CSI) at the legitimate monitor,
we characterize the fundamental information-theoretic limits of
proactive eavesdropping. We consider both delay-sensitive and
delay-tolerant applications for the suspicious communication,
under which the legitimate monitor maximizes the eavesdropping
non-outage probability (for event-based monitoring) and the
relative eavesdropping rate (for content analysis), respectively,
by optimizing the jamming power allocation over different
fading states subject to an average power constraint. Numerical
results show that the proposed proactive eavesdropping via cog-
nitive jamming approach greatly outperforms other benchmark
schemes. Furthermore, by extending to a more practical scenario
with residual SI and local CSI, we design an efficient online
cognitive jamming scheme inspired by the optimal cognitive
jamming with perfect SIC and global CSI.
Index Terms—Wireless information surveillance, proactive
eavesdropping, cognitive jamming, power allocation, full-duplex
radio.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, wireless security has attracted a lot of attentions
from both academia and industry, and various approaches
have been adopted to enhance the security of wireless net-
works among different layers of communication protocols [1].
Among others, physical layer security techniques have been
proposed as promising solutions to achieve perfect wireless
secrecy against malicious eavesdropping attacks, and there are
extensive studies in the literature investigating physical layer
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security techniques under different system setups (see, e.g.,
[2]–[5] and the references therein). These existing works focus
on preserving the confidentiality of wireless communications
by assuming communication users to be rightful and viewing
the information eavesdropping as malicious attacks. However,
from a broader national security perspective, they overlook the
possibility that communication links can also be used by crim-
inals or terrorists and the resultant problems for information
surveillance.
With recent advancements in wireless technologies, many
infrastructure-free wireless communication links are estab-
lished for various applications. For example, smartphones in
proximity can enable peer-to-peer data connections via Wi-Fi
and bluetooth without Internet infrastructures,1 or via device-
to-device (D2D) communications in the fifth-generation (5G)
cellular networks without going through cellular infrastruc-
tures. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can be employed
as mobile relays to assist information exchange between
ground users [6]–[8]. These emerging infrastructure-free wire-
less communications, however, can be used by criminals or
terrorists to commit crimes or terror attacks. For instance,
terrorists can use them to share information on a public trans-
portation (e.g., in a plane) to facilitate hijacking or bombing
activities, and undercover spies inside an isolated innovative
enterprise can use them to send out the secret business data to
outside peers. Since these communications do not go through
any core infrastructures, they are difficult to be monitored by
conventional surveillance approaches that intercept the com-
munication data at the Internet backbones or cellular central
offices.2 As a result, there is a growing need for authorized
parties (such as government agencies) to develop new wireless
information surveillance approaches to legitimately monitor
these infrastructure-free suspicious communication links (see,
e.g., [10]–[14]). These new wireless information surveillance
approaches are also expected to be implemented to monitor
infrastructure-based wireless communications in real time as
a supplement of conventional Internet backbone surveillance.
To cope with the increasing information monitoring needs
in wireless security, in this paper we propose a paradigm shift
from the conventional physical layer security against illegit-
imate eavesdropping to the new information surveillance by
1For example, FireChat is a mobile chatting software
that allows nearby users to interconnect in a mobile ad
hoc network by using Wi-Fi and/or Bluetooth locally (see
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/525921/the-latest-chat-app-for-iphone-needs-no-internet
2Note that the conventional approaches are used in the Terrorist Surveillance
Program for legitimate information surveillance launched by the National
Security Agency (NSA) of the United States [9].
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Fig. 1. An information surveillance scenario where a legitimate monitor proactively eavesdrops the suspicious communication from a transmitter to a receiver
via cognitive jamming.
exploiting legitimate eavesdropping. In particular, we consider
a wireless scenario as shown in Fig. 1, where a legitimate mon-
itor aims to intercept a suspicious communication link from
a transmitter to a receiver over fading channels.3 Under this
setup, the legitimate monitor can successfully eavesdrop (de-
code) the suspicious communication only when the received
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) (and accordingly the achievable
data rate) at the legitimate monitor is no smaller than that
at the suspicious receiver, since in this case the legitimate
monitor is able to decode the whole information that can be
decoded at the suspicious receiver.4 In practice, such legitimate
eavesdropping is particularly challenging, since the legitimate
monitor may be far away from the suspicious transmitter and
cannot eavesdrop efficiently. This motivates us to design new
methods to improve the legitimate eavesdropping performance
in this work.
We propose a proactive eavesdropping via cognitive jam-
ming approach (see Fig. 1), in which the legitimate monitor
operates in a full-duplex mode, and purposely sends jam-
ming signals to interfere with the suspicious link, so as to
decrease the achievable data rate at the suspicious receiver for
overhearing more efficiently. For such a full-duplex legitimate
monitor, its eavesdropping and jamming antennas can either
be co-located or separately located, as shown in Figs. 1-(a)
and 1-(b), respectively. The co-located structure can facilitate
the joint design of eavesdropping and jamming, but may
lead to severe self-interference (SI) from the jamming to the
eavesdropping antennas. Due to the finite dynamic range of
practical analog-to-digital converter (ADC), such SI is difficult
to be cancelled perfectly, although it is recently reported that
advanced analog and digital SIC schemes are able to achieve
up to 110 dB SI reduction [15]. In contrast, although the
separate structure requires an extra low-latency backhaul link
to connect the eavesdropping and jamming antennas to enable
their joint operation, it effectively alleviates the SI problem
by extending the distance between the transmitting/receiver
antennas. Furthermore, the separate structure may have better
3We assume that the suspicious transmitter and receiver have been detected
a priori by authorized parties, and a legitimate monitor is assigned to monitor
them accordingly. How to detect suspicious users and associate the suspicious
users with the legitimate monitor can be referred to in [10].
4For the purpose of initial investigation, here we assume that the suspicious
communication does not employ advanced anti-eavesdropping schemes such
as the physical-layer security techniques.
eavesdropping and jamming performances by distributing the
corresponding antennas in proximity of the suspicious trans-
mitter and receiver, respectively. Also, it is more resilient to
the anti-eavesdropping of the suspicious transmitter, since the
separately located eavesdropping antenna is less susceptible
to get exposed. For both co-located and separate structures, to
maximize the effectiveness of jamming for eavesdropping, it
is important for the legitimate monitor to cognitively control
the jamming power according to different fading states under
its limited jamming power constraint. The main results of this
paper are summarized as follows.
First, by assuming perfect SI cancelation (SIC) and global
channel state information (CSI) at the legitimate monitor,
we characterize the fundamental information-theoretic perfor-
mance limits of proactive eavesdropping. In particular, we
consider two different applications (i.e., delay-sensitive and
delay-tolerant applications) for the suspicious communication,
under which the legitimate monitor is interested in maximizing
the eavesdropping non-outage probability and the relative
eavesdropping rate (to the suspicious link’s rate), respectively.
Accordingly, we formulate two optimization problems for
the legitimate monitor, by optimizing its jamming power
allocation over different fading states subject to an average
power constraint.
For the delay-sensitive applications, the eavesdropping non-
outage probability maximization problem is shown to be irre-
spective of the transmit power allocation strategies at the suspi-
cious transmitter, and we obtain the optimal cognitive jamming
solution via the Lagrangian duality method. It is shown that the
legitimate monitor jams only over the desired fading states of
successful eavesdropping. For the delay-tolerant applications,
the relative eavesdropping rate maximization problem depends
critically on the power allocation strategies at the suspicious
transmitter. In particular, we consider two commonly used
transmit power allocation strategies (i.e., fixed power trans-
mission and water-filling power allocation) at the suspicious
transmitter, and obtain the optimal cognitive jamming solu-
tions for the legitimate monitor. It is shown that the legitimate
monitor may also jam over the undesired fading states of
unsuccessful eavesdropping, since such jamming helps reduce
the communication rate of the suspicious link in these fading
states and therefore increase the percentage of successful
eavesdropping rate in the desired fading states. Numerical re-
3sults show that the proposed proactive eavesdropping via cog-
nitive jamming approach greatly outperforms three benchmark
schemes including the conventional passive eavesdropping
without jamming, the proactive eavesdropping with constant-
power jamming, and the proactive eavesdropping with on-off
jamming.
Next, inspired by the above optimal cognitive jamming
with perfect SIC and global CSI, we further design an online
cognitive jamming scheme under practical assumptions of
residual SI and local CSI. It is shown that the online cognitive
jamming scheme achieves similar eavesdropping performance
as the optimal cognitive jamming with perfect SIC and global
CSI, especially when the legitimate monitor has separately
equipped eavesdropping and jamming antennas.
It is worth noting that our proposed proactive eavesdropping
via cognitive jamming approach is different from the con-
ventionally investigated jamming and eavesdropping attacks
in the literature. In particular, the conventional jamming has
been investigated to disrupt wireless communications (e.g., of
enemies in ballfields) without considering eavesdropping (see,
e.g., [16], [17]). In contrast, our paper utilizes jamming to fa-
cilitate the simultaneous eavesdropping at legitimate monitors.
On the other hand, there have also been a handful of recent
works investigating the secrecy capacity in the presence of
active eavesdroppers that can both jam and eavesdrop [18]–
[21]. However, these existing works focused on preserving
the confidentiality of wireless communications by viewing the
(passive or active) eavesdropping as illegitimate attacks, while
in this paper we look at a new research angle by considering
eavesdropping as legitimate monitoring from the surveillance
perspective.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the system model and formulates the eavesdropping
non-outage probability and the relative eavesdropping rate
maximization problems of our interest under perfect SIC and
global CSI at the legitimate monitor. Section III develops the
optimal solution to the eavesdropping non-outage probability
maximization problem. Sections IV and V propose the optimal
solutions to the relative eavesdropping rate maximization
problems by considering that the suspicious transmitter adopts
fixed power transmission and water-filling power allocation,
respectively. Section VI shows the numerical results to validate
the performance of our proposed proactive eavesdropping via
cognitive jamming approach. Section VII presents the online
cognitive jamming scheme under a more practical scenario
with residual SI and local CSI. Finally, Section VIII concludes
this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a point-to-point suspi-
cious wireless communication link from a transmitter to a
receiver over a frequency non-selective channel, and there
is a legitimate monitor aiming to eavesdrop this link. The
suspicious transmitter and receiver are each deployed with a
single antenna, and the legitimate monitor is equipped with
two antennas, one for eavesdropping (receiving) and the other
for jamming (transmitting). The legitimate monitor can operate
in a full-duplex mode to jam and eavesdrop at the same
time. We consider a block fading model, where the wireless
channels remain constant over each block and may change
from one block to another. Let h0(ν), h1(ν), and h2(ν) denote
the channel coefficients from the suspicious transmitter to
the suspicious receiver, from the suspicious transmitter to the
eavesdropping antenna of the legitimate monitor, and from
the jamming antenna of the legitimate monitor to the suspi-
cious receiver, respectively, where ν denotes the joint fading
state. The corresponding channel power gains are denoted as
g0(ν) = |h0(ν)|
2
, g1(ν) = |h1(ν)|
2
, and g2(ν) = |h2(ν)|2,
respectively. Here, g0(ν), g1(ν), and g2(ν) are assumed to
be three random variables with a continuous joint probability
density function (PDF) denoted by φν(g0, g1, g2). Both the
suspicious transmitter and receiver perfectly know the CSI of
the suspicious channel (i.e., g0(ν)).
In order to characterize the fundamental information-
theoretic performance limits of proactive eavesdropping, we
make two following two assumptions. First, the legitimate
monitor can perfectly cancel the SI from the jamming antenna
to the eavesdropping antenna by using advanced analog and
digital SIC schemes [22]. Note that the implementation of
SIC requires the legitimate monitor to know the loop-back
channel from the jamming to the eavesdropping antennas (via
efficient channel estimation) [15]. Next, the legitimate monitor
perfectly knows the global CSI of suspicious, eavesdropping,
and jamming channels (i.e., g0(ν), g1(ν), and g2(ν)) at each
fading state ν, as well as the joint PDF φν(g0, g1, g2). Note
that the global CSI assumption has been commonly made in
the information-theoretic literature (see, e.g., the correlated
jamming in [17] and the cognitive radio in [23], [24]). We
will consider the practical scenario with residual SI and local
CSI in Section VII.
Let the message sent by the suspicious transmitter and the
jamming signal generated by the legitimate monitor be denoted
by s and x, respectively, both of which are assumed to be
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG) random vari-
ables with zero mean and unit variance. Note that transmitting
CSCG signals at the suspicious transmitter is known to achieve
the channel capacity subject to the CSCG noise, while using
CSCG jamming signals is the best strategy for the legitimate
monitor to degrade the suspicious communication when the
suspicious transmitter uses CSCG signaling [17]. We consider
that at each fading state ν, the suspicious transmitter employs
the transmit power p(ν) > 0, and the legitimate monitor
cognitively adjusts its jamming power to q(ν) ≥ 0. Let
P > 0 and Q > 0 denote the maximum average transmit and
jamming power at the suspicious transmitter and the legitimate
monitor, respectively. Thus we have
Eν(p(ν)) ≤ P, (1)
Eν(q(ν)) ≤ Q, (2)
where Eν(·) denotes the expectation over the joint fading
state ν. Then, the received signals at the suspicious receiver
and the eavesdropping antenna of the legitimate monitor are
4respectively denoted as
y0 =
√
p(ν)h0(ν)s+
√
q(ν)h2(ν)x + n0, (3)
y1 =
√
p(ν)h1(ν)s+ n1, (4)
where n0 and n1 with zero mean and variances σ20 and σ21
denote the additive white Gaussian noises (AWGNs) at the
suspicious receiver and the legitimate monitor, respectively.
Accordingly, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)
at the suspicious receiver and the SNR at the legitimate
monitor receiver are respectively denoted as
γ0(ν) =
g0(ν)p(ν)
g2(ν)q(ν) + σ20
, (5)
γ1(ν) =
g1(ν)p(ν)
σ21
. (6)
As a result, the achievable rates (in bps/Hz) of the suspicious
link and the eavesdropping link in the fading state ν are
respectively denoted as
r0(ν) = log2
(
1 +
g0(ν)p(ν)
g2(ν)q(ν) + σ20
)
, (7)
r1(ν) = log2
(
1 +
g1(ν)p(ν)
σ21
)
. (8)
Based on the SINR γ0(ν) at the suspicious receiver and
the SNR γ1(ν) at the legitimate monitor for one particular
fading state ν, we consider that the legitimate monitor can
successfully eavesdrop the suspicious communication only
when γ1(ν) is no smaller than γ0(ν) (i.e., γ1(ν) ≥ γ0(ν)
or equivalently r1(ν) ≥ r0(ν)), since in this case the legit-
imate monitor can successfully decode the information sent
in the suspicious link. Here, in order to focus our study on
the physical layer perspective, we have ignored the possible
encryption and decryption methods that can be employed at
higher layers in the suspicious user communication. Therefore,
we introduce the following indicator function to denote the
event of successful eavesdropping at the legitimate monitor:
X(ν) =
{
1, if γ1(ν) ≥ γ0(ν)
0, otherwise,
(9)
where X(ν) = 1 and X(ν) = 0 indicate eavesdropping
non-outage and outage events, respectively. Note that the
indicator function X(ν) is irrespective of the transmit power
p(ν) at the suspicious transmitter. Accordingly, we define the
eavesdropping rate of the legitimate monitor at fading state ν
as
r(ν) = r0(ν)X(ν). (10)
The legitimate eavesdropping performance depends on dif-
ferent application scenarios for the suspicious communica-
tion. Specifically, we consider both delay-sensitive and delay-
tolerant suspicious applications, and define the corresponding
legitimate eavesdropping performance metrics as follows.
First, consider delay-sensitive applications, in which the
suspicious transmitter adopts non-zero transmit power p(ν)
at each fading state to deliver event-based information with
strict delay constraints (e.g., real-time videos taken by its
own camera), and the legitimate monitor aims to continuously
track or monitor critical suspicious events. In this case, the
delivered suspicious messages (e.g., the real-time video clips)
in different fading states have the same significance to report
and infer such series of ongoing events, although they may
be with different data rates (e.g., different resolutions) due to
the channel fading. Under such an event-based scenario, it is
beneficial for the legitimate monitor to successfully eavesdrop
over as many fading states as possible. As a result, we
introduce the eavesdropping non-outage probability, given by
Eν(X(ν)), as the event-based legitimate eavesdropping perfor-
mance metric. Then, we aim to maximize the eavesdropping
non-outage probability Eν(X(ν)) by optimizing the jamming
power allocation {q(ν)} at the legitimate monitor subject to
its average power constraint in (2), for which the optimization
problem is formulated as
(P1) : max
{q(ν)}
Eν(X(ν))
s.t. q(ν) ≥ 0, ∀ν (11)
(2).
Since the eavesdropping non-outage probability X(ν) is irre-
spective of the transmit power p(ν) at the suspicious transmit-
ter, it is evident that the optimal cognitive jamming solution
to (P1) is independent of the power allocation strategies
employed at the suspicious transmitter. Also note that problem
(P1) is non-convex in general, since its objective function is
not concave over the jamming power allocation {q(ν)}. De-
spite the non-convexity, we will solve problem (P1) optimally
in Section III.
Next, consider delay-tolerant applications, where the sus-
picious transmitter sends content-based information (such as
data files) to the receiver and the monitor targets at data accu-
mulation and content analysis. In this case, every transmitted
bit may have the same significance to help content analysis,
and it is thus desirable for the legitimate monitor to eavesdrop
as many bits (relative to the sent bits) as possible. As a result,
we use the relative eavesdropping rate, defined as the average
eavesdropping rate over the average communication rate of the
suspicious link, i.e., Eν(r(ν))
Eν(r0(ν))
= Eν(r0(ν)X(ν))
Eν(r0(ν))
, as the content-
based legitimate eavesdropping performance criterion. In this
case, the relative eavesdropping rate maximization problem for
the legitimate monitor is formulated as
max
{q(ν)}
Eν(r0(ν)X(ν))
Eν(r0(ν))
(12)
s.t. (2) and (11).
Problem (12) is in general more challenging to be solved
than (P1), which is due to the fact that the objective function
in (12) is non-concave and depends on the transmit power
{p(ν)} employed at the suspicious transmitter. It is difficult
to solve problem (12) under general power allocations at the
suspicious transmitter. As a result, in Sections IV and V
we will solve problem (12) under two commonly adopted
transmission schemes for the suspicious transmitter, i.e., fixed
power transmission and water-filling power allocation, respec-
tively.
5III. OPTIMAL COGNITIVE JAMMING IN DELAY-SENSITIVE
SUSPICIOUS APPLICATIONS
First, we consider problem (P1) to maximize the eavesdrop-
ping non-outage probability for event-driven monitoring in
delay-sensitive suspicious applications. Although (P1) is non-
convex in general, one can verify that it satisfies the time-
sharing condition defined in [25], as shown in the following
lemma.
Lemma 3.1: Let {qa(ν)} and {qb(ν)} denote the optimal
solutions to (P1) under the average jamming power constraints
Qa and Qb, respectively. Then for any 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, there always
exists a feasible solution {qc(ν)} such that
Eν(X
c(ν)) ≥ θEν(X
a(ν)) + (1− θ)Eν(X
b(ν)),
Eν(q
c(ν)) ≤ θQa + (1− θ)Qb,
where {X i(ν)} denotes the corresponding {X(ν)} in (9) un-
der the given jamming power allocation {qi(ν)}, i ∈ {a, b, c}.
Proof: This lemma can be proved by using a similar
approach as shown in [25]. Consider each fading state ν which
happens over a certain amount of time. Then we can allocate
the jamming power qc(ν) to be qa(ν) for a θ percentage
of the time, and qb(ν) for the remaining 1 − θ percentage
of the time. Then it follows that Xc(ν) = θXa(ν) + (1 −
θ)Xb(ν) and qc(ν) = θqa(ν) + (1 − θ)qb(ν). By coming all
these fading states, we have Eν(Xc(ν)) = θEν(Xa(ν)) +
(1 − θ)Eν(X
b(ν)), and Eν(qc(ν)) = θEν(qa(ν)) + (1 −
θ)Eν(q
b(ν)) ≤ θQa + (1 − θ)Qb. This implies that the time-
sharing condition stipulated in [25] is satisfied for problem
(P1), and therefore, this lemma is verified.
The time-sharing condition in Lemma 3.1 ensures that
strong duality or zero duality gap holds between (P1) and
its Lagrange dual problem [25, Theorem 1].5 Therefore, we
can use the Lagrange duality method to solve problem (P1)
optimally [27]. The optimal solution to (P1) is obtained in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.1: The optimal cognitive jamming solution to
(P1) is given as
q∗1(ν) ={ (
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
, if 0 <
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
< 1
λ∗1
,
0, otherwise,
(13)
where λ∗1 denotes the optimal dual variable associated with
the average jamming power constraint in (2). In particular, if
Q is sufficiently large with Eν
((
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
)
< Q,
it follows that λ∗1 → 0 and
q∗1(ν) =
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
, ∀ν. (14)
Otherwise, λ∗1 is set such that Eν(q∗1(ν)) = Q.
Proof: See Appendix A.
5The strong duality between (P1) and and its Lagrange dual problem can
also be verified by using the technique in [26], which uses the Lyapunov
theorem in functional analysis to prove the strong duality for a class of
problems with “continuous formulations”.
Note that the optimal jamming power allocation {q∗1(ν)}
depends on
{(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
}
. For a fading state ν with(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
≤ 0, the monitor can already overhear
from the transmitter successfully without jamming. Thus, it
always holds that γ1(ν) ≥ γ0(ν) and X(ν) = 1, and thus no
jamming is required, i.e., q∗1(ν) = 0. For each of the other
fading states,
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
> 0 denotes the required
jamming power for the legitimate monitor to successfully
eavesdrop the suspicious link, under which it holds that
γ1(ν) = γ0(ν). Among these fading states, the legitimate mon-
itor selects to jam those with
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
smaller
than the threshold 1
λ∗1
, so as to maximize the eavesdropping
non-outage probability while satisfying the average jamming
power constraint.
IV. OPTIMAL COGNITIVE JAMMING IN DELAY-TOLERANT
SUSPICIOUS APPLICATIONS WITH FIXED POWER
TRANSMISSION
In this section, we consider problem (12) to maximize the
relative eavesdropping rate for content-driven monitoring in
delay-tolerant suspicious applications, where the suspicious
transmitter employs fixed power transmission, i.e., p(ν) =
P, ∀ν. Note that fixed power transmission is a commonly used
strategy that is easy to implement at the transmitter, while
we will consider the case with adaptive power transmission
at the suspicious transmitter in Section V. With fixed power
transmission, we rewrite the achievable rate r0(ν) of the
suspicious link in (7) as
r¯0(ν) = log2
(
1 +
g0(ν)P
g2(ν)q(ν) + σ20
)
. (15)
As a result, the relative eavesdropping rate maximization
problem (12) is reformulated as
(P2) : max
{q(ν)}
Eν(r¯0(ν)X(ν))
Eν(r¯0(ν))
s.t. (2) and (11).
In the following, we solve problem (P2) by first equivalently
transforming it into solving a sequence of feasibility problems,
and then using the Lagrange duality method to solve each
feasibility problem.
First, we introduce an auxiliary variable t, and equivalently
re-express problem (P2) as
(P2.1) : max
{q(ν)},t
t
s.t. Eν(r¯0(ν)X(ν)) ≥ tEν(r¯0(ν)) (16)
(2) and (11).
Then, we show that the optimal solution to problem (P2.1) can
be obtained by equivalently solving a sequence of feasibility
problems each for a fixed t and given by
(P2.2) : find {q(ν)}
s.t. (2), (11) and (16). (17)
Suppose that the optimal value of problem (P2.1) is denoted
as t∗, where it must hold that 0 ≤ t∗ ≤ 1. If problem (P2.2) is
6feasible under a given t, then it follows that t∗ ≥ t; otherwise,
t∗ < t. Thus, by solving problem (P2.2) with different t’s and
applying a simple bisection search over t, t∗ can be obtained
for problem (P2.1). As a result, to obtain the optimal solution
to (P2.1) and thus (P2), we only need to solve problem (P2.2)
under any given 0 ≤ t ≤ 1.
Next, we focus on solving problem (P2.2) with any given
0 ≤ t ≤ 1. Despite that problem (P2.2) is still non-convex, it
can be verified that strong duality or zero duality gap holds for
(P2.2), since it satisfies the time-sharing condition [25], which
can be similarly shown as in Lemma 3.1. For this reason, in
the following we check the feasibility of (P2.2) and obtain its
optimal solution (when it is feasible) by making use of the
Lagrange dual function of problem (P2.2).
Let the dual variables associated with the constraints in (16)
and (2) be denoted by µ ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0, respectively. Then
the partial Lagrangian of problem (P2.2) is denoted as
L2({q(ν)}, µ, λ)
=µ (Eν((X(ν)− t)r¯0(ν)))− λ (Eν(q(ν)) −Q) . (18)
As a result, the dual function of (P2.2) is expressed as
f2(µ, λ) = max
{q(ν)≥0}
L2({q(ν)}, µ, λ). (19)
Then, the following proposition helps determine whether prob-
lem (P2.2) is feasible or not.
Proposition 4.1: Problem (P2.2) is infeasible if and only if
there exist µ ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0 such that f2(µ, λ) < 0.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Note that for any α > 0, f2(αµ, αλ) = αf2(µ, λ). As
a result, if problem (P2.2) is infeasible, then f2(µ, λ) is
unbounded from below, i.e., f2(µ, λ)→ −∞; while if problem
(P2.2) is feasible, then it follows that minµ≥0,λ≥0 f2(µ, λ) =
f2(µ
⋆
2, λ
⋆
2) = 0 with µ⋆2 ≥ 0 and λ⋆2 ≥ 0 being the optimal
dual solutions to problem (P2.2). This observation will be used
to develop a numerical algorithm to solve problem (P2.2) later.
Now, it remains to solve problem (19) to obtain f2(µ, λ)
under any given µ ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0. By dropping the
constant λQ, problem (19) can be decomposed into various
subproblems as follows each for one fading state ν.
max
q(ν)≥0
µ(X(ν)− t)r¯0(ν) − λq(ν) (20)
We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2: Under any given µ ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0, the
optimal solution to problem (20) and thus problem (19) is
given as
q
(µ,λ)
2 (ν) =

0, if
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
≤ 0(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
, if
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
> 0
and v¯1(ν) ≥ v¯2(ν)
q¯(ν), if
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
> 0
and v¯1(ν) < v¯2(ν),
(21)
TABLE I
ALGORITHM FOR SOLVING THE FEASIBILITY PROBLEM (P2.2)
Algorithm 1
1) Initialization: Set the iteration index n = 0, and given an ellipsoid ξ(0) ⊆
R
2 centered at [µ(0), λ(0)]T .
2) Repeat:
a) Solve problem (19) under given µ(n) and λ(n) by using Proposition 4.2
to obtain f2(µ(n), λ(n));
b) If f2(µ(n), λ(n)) < 0, then problem (P2.2) is infeasible, exit the
algorithm; otherwise, go to the next step.
c) Update the ellipsoid ξ(n+1) based on ξ(n) and the subgradient
s2(µ
(n), λ(n)). Set [µ(n+1), λ(n+1)]T as the center for ξ(n+1) .
d) n← n + 1;
3) Until the stopping criteria for the ellipsoid method is met.
4) Set µ⋆2 = µ(n) and λ⋆2 = λ(n) . Problem (P2.2) is feasible, and{
q
(µ⋆2 ,λ
⋆
2)
2 (ν)
}
in Proposition 4.2 becomes its optimal solution.
with
q¯(ν) ,min
(
max
(
0,
√
g20(ν)P
2 + 4tµg0(ν)g2(ν)P/(ln 2 · λ)
2g2(ν)
−
g0(ν)P
2g2(ν)
−
σ20
g2(ν)
)
,
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
)
(22)
denoting the optimal jamming power when the legitimate
receiver cannot eavesdrop the suspicious link. Here, v¯1(ν) and
v¯2(ν) denote the optimal values achieved by problem (20)
when X(ν) = 1 (eavesdropping is successful) and X(ν) = 0
(eavesdropping is not successful), respectively, and are given
by
v¯1(ν) =µ (1− t) log2
(
1 +
g1(ν)P
σ21
)
− λ
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
, (23)
v¯2(ν) =− µt log2
(
1 +
g0(ν)P
g2(ν)q¯(ν) + σ20
)
− λq¯(ν). (24)
Proof: See Appendix C.
With Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 at hand, we are ready to
present the complete algorithm to solve the feasibility problem
(P2.2) via the subgradient based ellipsoid method [28], by
using the fact that the subgradient of f2(µ, λ) is s2(µ, λ) =[
Eν
((
X(µ,λ)(ν)− t
)
r¯
(µ,λ)
0 (ν)
)
, Q− Eν(q
(µ,λ)
2 (ν))
]T
under given µ and λ. Here, {r¯(µ,λ)0 (ν)} and {X(µ,λ)(ν)}
denote the corresponding {r¯0(ν)} and {X(ν)} under given
{q
(µ,λ)
2 (ν)}, respectively. The detailed algorithm for solving
problem (P2.2) is summarized as Algorithm 1 in Table I,
for which the optimal solution (when (P2.2) is feasible)
is denoted as
{
q
(µ⋆2 ,λ
⋆
2)
2 (ν)
}
with µ⋆2 and λ⋆2 denoting the
optimal dual solution.
Finally, by applying Algorithm 1 to solve problem (P2.2) to-
gether with the bisection search for finding the optimal t∗, we
obtain the optimal solution to problem (P2.1) and (P2). Under
t∗, denote the corresponding optimal dual solution µ⋆2 and λ⋆2
to (P2.2) as µ∗2 and λ∗2. Then the optimal solution to (P2.1)
and (P2) is given as {q∗2(ν)} with q∗2(ν) = q(µ
∗
2 ,λ
∗
2)
2 (ν), ∀ν.
7V. OPTIMAL COGNITIVE JAMMING IN DELAY-TOLERANT
SUSPICIOUS APPLICATIONS WITH WATER-FILLING POWER
ALLOCATION
In this section, we consider problem (12) to maximize the
relative eavesdropping rate for content-driven monitoring in
delay-tolerant suspicious applications, where the suspicious
transmitter employs adaptive power transmission to maximize
its own average communication rate via water-filling power
allocation over different fading states. In this case, the power
allocation {p(ν)} at the suspicious transmitter varies depend-
ing on the jamming power profile {q(ν)} at the legitimate
monitor. As a result, we first present the water-filling power
allocation at the suspicious transmitter under any given {q(ν)},
and then present the relative eavesdropping rate maximization
problem over {q(ν)} under such a power adaptation strategy.
First, suppose that the jamming power profile {q(ν)} at
the legitimate monitor is given. In this case, the suspicious
transmitter optimizes its transmit power allocation {p(ν)} to
maximize its average achievable data rate Eν (r0(ν)) in (7)
subject to its average power constraint in (1), for which the
optimal water-filling power allocation solution is given as [29]6
pˆ(ν) =
[
1
ln 2 · β
−
g2(ν)q(ν) + σ
2
0
g0(ν)
]+
, ∀ν, (25)
where [x]+ = max(x, 0), and β ≥ 0 is the Lagrange dual
variable associated with the average transmit power constraint
in (1) at the suspicious transmitter, such that
Eν (pˆ(ν)) = P. (26)
Here, 1ln 2·β can be interpreted as the water level. Conse-
quently, the resulting achievable rate of the suspicious link
for the fading state ν is given by
rˆ0(ν) =
[
log2
(
g0(ν)
ln 2 · β(g2(ν)q(ν) + σ20)
)]+
, (27)
and the corresponding relative eavesdropping rate is given as
Eν(rˆ0(ν)X(ν))
Eν(rˆ0(ν))
.
Next, under the water-filling power allocation in (25) for
the suspicious transmitter, the relative eavesdropping rate
maximization problem (12) over the jamming power {q(ν)}
for the legitimate monitor is re-expressed as
(P3) : max
{q(ν)},β≥0
Eν(rˆ0(ν)X(ν))
Eν(rˆ0(ν))
s.t. (2), (11), and (26),
where β is an auxiliary variable to be optimized in addition
to {q(ν)}.7 In the rest of this section, we focus on solving
problem (P3).
6The implementation of the water-filling power allocation requires the
suspicious transmitter to know the interference power g2(ν)q(ν), which can
be measured by the suspicious receiver and sent back to the suspicious
transmitter.
7It is worth noting that the cognitive jamming optimization problem (P3)
here can be equivalently formulated as a bi-level optimization problem, where
the lower-level optimization task is for the suspicious transmitter to maximize
its average achievable rate Eν(r0(ν)), and the upper-level optimization task
is for the legitimate monitor to maximize the relative eavesdropping rate. In
particular, (P3) is equivalent to the upper-level optimization task, while the
water-filling power allocation in (25) corresponds to the optimal solution (with
respect to an auxiliary variable β) to the lower-level optimization.
Note that problem (P3) is a more difficult problem than (P2).
This is due to the fact that both the objective function of (P3)
and the constraint in (26) are non-convex, and furthermore,
the auxiliary variable β is related to all the fading states. To
optimally solve problem (P3), we adopt an approach by first
finding the optimal {q(ν)} under any given auxiliary variable
β that is feasible (i.e., for (2), (11), and (26) to be satisfied at
the same time), and then using a one-dimensional exhaustive
search to obtain the optimal β for (P3) over its feasible regime,
i.e., the regime of β for problem (P3) to be feasible. In the
following, we first determine the feasible regime of β, and then
optimize {q(ν)} for problem (P3) under any given β within
such a feasible regime.
A. Finding the Feasible Regime of β
It is evident that in order for (2), (11), and (26) to be
satisfied at the same time, the feasible β is upper and lower
bounded by βmax and βmin, respectively. First, we obtain
the upper bound of β, i.e., βmax. It is observed from (25)
and (26) that as the jamming power increases, the variable
β decreases accordingly. As a result, the upper bound of
β is achieved when the legitimate monitor does not send
any jamming signals by setting q(ν) = 0, ∀ν. By using this
together with (25) and (26), the upper bound βmax can be
obtained.
Next, we obtain the lower bound of β, i.e., βmin. Based
on the similar observation above, the lower bound βmin
is achieved when full jamming power is employed with
Eν (q(ν)) = Q. However, it remains unknown how the
jamming power is allocated over different fading states. To
overcome this issue, we propose to solve a series of feasibility
problems each with a given β.
find {q(ν)} (28)
s.t. (2), (11), and (26).
For any given β, if problem (28) is feasible, then βmin ≤ β;
otherwise, we have βmin > β. Based on this observation, βmin
can be found by solving problem (28) under any given β,
together with a bisection search over β. Since it is known that
β should lie within the interval [0, βmax], the bisection search
is employed over such an interval. Now, we only need to focus
on solving problem (28) under any given β ∈ [0, βmax].
First, we show that strong duality holds for problem (28),
although it is non-convex in general due to the nonlinear
equality constraint in (26).
Lemma 5.1: Strong duality holds between problem (28) and
its dual problem.
Proof: Note that the equality constraint in (26) is indeed
equivalent to two inequality constraints, i.e., Eν (pˆ(ν)) ≤ P
and Eν (pˆ(ν)) ≥ P . As a result, the time sharing property still
holds for problem (28) [25]. Therefore, strong duality holds
between problem (28) and its dual problem. As a result, this
lemma is proved.
Next, we use the Lagrange duality method to check the
feasibility of problem (28). Since the derivation procedure is
similar to that for checking the feasibility of problem (P2.2),
we omit the detail here, and leave it in Appendix D.
8B. Optimizing {q(ν)} for Problem (P3) Under Any Given
Feasible β
Next, we obtain the optimal cognitive jamming power
solution {q(ν)} for problem (P3) under any given β with
βmin ≤ β ≤ βmax, for which the optimization problem is
rewritten as:
(P3.1) : max
{q(ν)}
Eν(rˆ0(ν)X(ν))
Eν(rˆ0(ν))
s.t. (2), (11), and (26).
By introducing an auxiliary variable t, problem (P3.1) is
equivalently expressed as
(P3.2) : max
{q(ν)},t
t
s.t. Eν(rˆ0(ν)X(ν)) ≥ tEν(rˆ0(ν)) (29)
(2), (11), and (26).
To solve problem (P3.2), we use a similar approach as for
solving (P2.1) in Section III, in which we first solve the
following feasibility problem under any given t and then
search t via bisection over the regime [0, 1].
(P3.3) : find {q(ν)}
s.t. (2), (11), (26), and (29).
In the rest of this subsection, we focus on solving the feasi-
bility problem (P3.3).
First, it can be verified similarly as for Lemmas 3.1 and 5.1
that strong duality holds between problem (P3.3) and its dual
problem. As a result, we use the Lagrange duality method to
solve this problem. Let the dual variables associated with the
constraints in (29), (2), and (26) be denoted by µ ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0,
ζ, respectively. Then the partial Lagrangian of problem (P3.3)
is denoted as
L3({q(ν)}, µ, λ, ζ) = µ (Eν((X(ν)− t)rˆ0(ν)))
− λ (Eν(q(ν)) −Q)− ζ (Eν (pˆ(ν)) − P ) . (30)
As a result, the dual function of (P3.3) is expressed as
f3(µ, λ, ζ) = max
{q(ν)≥0}
L3({q(ν)}, µ, λ, ζ). (31)
The dual problem is accordingly written as
min
µ≥0,λ≥0,ζ
f3(µ, λ, ζ). (32)
Here, the optimal value of the dual problem (32) is zero
when problem (P3.3) is feasible, while it approaches to −∞
otherwise.
Similar to Proposition 4.1, we have the following proposi-
tion, whose proof is omitted for brevity. This proposition can
be used for checking the feasibility of problem (P3.3) later.
Proposition 5.1: Problem (28) is infeasible if and only if
there exist µ ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0 and ζ such that f3(µ, λ, ζ) < 0.
Furthermore, we have the following proposition to find the
optimal solution to problem (31) to obtain f3(µ, λ, ζ) under
given any µ ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0, and ζ.
Proposition 5.2: The optimal solution to problem (31) is
given as
q
(µ,λ,ζ)
3 (ν) =

qˆ1(ν), if vˆ1(ν) > vˆ3(ν)
and (vˆ1(ν) > vˆ2(ν) or qˆ2(ν) ≥ qˆ1(ν))
qˆ2(ν), if vˆ2(ν) > vˆ1(ν)
and vˆ2(ν) > vˆ3(ν) and qˆ2(ν) < qˆ1(ν)
qˆ3(ν), if vˆ3(ν) > vˆ1(ν)
and (vˆ3(ν) > vˆ2(ν) or qˆ2(ν) ≥ qˆ1(ν))
, ∀ν.
(33)
Here,
qˆ1(ν) ,
[
g0(ν)
ln 2 · βg2(ν)
−
σ20
g2(ν)
]+
(34)
denotes the jamming power such that the suspicious transmit-
ter does not allocate any power over the fading state ν (due
to the water-filling power allocation),
qˆ2(ν) ,
[(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
]+
(35)
means the minimum jamming power for the legitimate monitor
to successfully eavesdrop the suspicious communication, and
qˆ3(ν) = [min(qˆ1(ν), qˆ2(ν), qˆ4(ν))]
+ (36)
represents the used jamming power when the legitimate mon-
itor cannot successfully eavesdrop with
qˆ4(ν) ,
g0(ν)tµ
ln 2 · (g0(ν)λ − ζg2(ν))
−
σ20
g2(ν)
. (37)
Accordingly, their resultant objective values of problem (31)
are respectively given by
vˆ1(ν) = −λqˆ1(ν), (38)
vˆ2(ν) = µ(1− t) log2
(
g0(ν)
ln 2 · β(g2(ν)qˆ2(ν) + σ20)
)
− λqˆ2(ν)− ζ
(
1
ln 2 · β
−
g2(ν)qˆ2(ν) + σ
2
0
g0(ν)
)
, (39)
vˆ3(ν) = −tµ log2
(
g0(ν)
ln 2 · β(g2(ν)qˆ3(ν) + σ20)
)
− λqˆ3(ν)− ζ
(
1
ln 2 · β
−
g2(ν)qˆ3(ν) + σ
2
0
g0(ν)
)
. (40)
Proof: See Appendix E.
With the optimal solution to problem (31) given in Proposition
5.2 together with Proposition 5.1, we can then apply the
ellipsoid method to solve the dual problem (32) by using the
fact that the subgradient of f3(µ, λ, ζ) is
s3(µ, λ, ζ) =
[
Eν
((
X(µ,λ,ζ)(ν)− t
)
rˆ
(µ,λ,ζ)
0 (ν)
)
,
Q− Eν(q
(µ,λ,ζ)
3 (ν)), P − Eν
(
pˆ(µ,λ,ζ)(ν)
)]T
.
Here, {rˆ(µ,λ,ζ)0 (ν)}, {X(µ,λ,ζ)(ν)}, and {pˆ(µ,λ,ζ)(ν)} denote
the corresponding {rˆ0(ν)} in (27), {X(ν)} in (9), and {pˆ(ν)}
in (25) under given {q(µ,λ,ζ)3 (ν)}, respectively.
Note that the detailed complete algorithm for solving prob-
lem (P3.3) is similar to Algorithm 1, and thus is omitted
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Fig. 2. The relative eavesdropping rate versus the variable β when the
suspicious transmitter adopts the water-filling power allocation in the delay-
tolerant case.
for brevity. Therefore, problem (P3.3) is finally solved. When
problem (P3.3) is feasible, we denote its optimal solution as
{q⋆3(ν)}.
Finally, we use the bisection search to find the optimal t for
problem (P3.2) under any given β ∈ [βmin, βmax], and apply
the exhaustive search to obtain the optimal β for problem (P3).
Let the optimal β for problem (P3) and the correspondingly
optimal t for problem (P3.2) be denoted by β∗∗ and t∗∗,
respectively. As a result, the accordingly obtained {q⋆3(ν)}
becomes the optimal cognitive jamming power solution to
(P3), denoted by {q∗3(ν)}. Therefore, problem (P3) is solved.
Remark 5.1: To provide more insight, Fig. 2 shows the ob-
tained relative eavesdropping rate (the optimal value of (P3.1))
under given β versus the variable β (in the range between
βmin and βmax), where the system parameters are set as in
Section VI and the average jamming power at the legitimate
monitor is set to be Q = 20 dB. It is observed that the
relative eavesdropping rate first increases and then decreases as
a function of β. Note that we have also conducted simulations
under other setups which are not plotted here, and such a
property is also shown to be valid under these tests, although
it is very difficult to rigorously prove it. This property implies
that a simple bisection (instead of the complex exhaustive
search) may be sufficient to find the optimal β for problem
(P3). As a result, the complexity of solving problem (P3) can
be significantly reduced.
C. Comparison Among Different Optimal Cognitive Jamming
Solutions
In this subsection, we compare the optimal cognitive jam-
ming solutions under different application scenarios, i.e.,
{q∗1(ν)}, {q
∗
2(ν)}, and {q∗3(ν)} for problems (P1), (P2), and
(P3), respectively.
First, consider each fading state ν with(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
≤ 0, where the eavesdropping
link is better than the suspicious communication link. In
this case, since eavesdropping is always successful and no
jamming is required, the three optimal solutions are identical,
i.e., q∗3(ν) = q∗2(ν) = q∗1(ν) = 0.
Next, consider each of the other fading states ν with(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
> 0, where the eavesdropping link
is worse than the suspicious communication link and thus
the eavesdropping will not be successful without proactive
jamming. In this case, the optimal solution {q∗1(ν)} for
delay-sensitive applications are different from {q∗2(ν)} and
{q∗3(ν)} for delay-tolerant applications. Specifically, in delay-
sensitive applications, the legitimate monitor only jams over
the desired fading states when it can successfully eavesdrop
(after jamming); while in the delay-tolerant case, the legitimate
monitor may also jam over the undesired fading states when
it cannot successfully eavesdrop (even after jamming), since
it helps reduce the communication rate of the suspicious link
in these fading states and therefore increase the percentage of
successful eavesdropping rate in the desired channel states.
Finally, note that the optimal solutions {q∗2(ν)} and {q∗3(ν)}
are also different from each other at each fading state ν with(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
> 0. For example, when the suspicious
transmitter can adjust its transmit power via water-filling, the
legitimate monitor may choose between the jamming power
qˆ1(ν) such that the suspicious transmitter does not allocate
power over the fading state ν, versus qˆ2(ν) such that the
legitimate monitor can eavesdrop the suspicious link over
that fading state. In contrast, when the suspicious transmitter
adopts fixed power transmission, the legitimate monitor does
not need to consider the first option. It is also worth noting
that it is difficult for us to analytically compare the resulting
relative eavesdropping rate under fixed power transmission
with that under water-filling power allocation. As will be
shown in the numerical results later (see Fig. 8 in Section VI),
the relative eavesdropping rate under fixed power transmission
is higher than that under water-filling power allocation. This
implies that due to the potential water-filling power allocation
at the suspicious transmitter, in general higher average jam-
ming power is required for the legitimate monitor to achieve
the same relative eavesdropping rate as in the case with fixed
power transmission.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide numerical results to validate
the performance of our proposed proactive eavesdropping via
cognitive jamming approach, in terms of the eavesdropping
non-outage probability Eν(X(ν)) and the relative eavesdrop-
ping rate Eν(r¯0(ν)X(ν))
Eν(r¯0(ν))
. For comparison, we consider three
benchmark schemes as follows: 1) Proactive eavesdropping
with constant-power jamming: in this scheme, the legitimate
monitor uses constant jamming power over all fading states,
i.e., q(ν) = Q, ∀ν. 2) Proactive eavesdropping with “on-off”
jamming: in this scheme, the legitimate monitor does not send
any jamming signal over the fading state ν with g0(ν)
σ20
≤ g1(ν)
σ21(i.e., the eavesdropping is successful even without any jam-
ming), and allocates the jamming power equally over all the
other fading states. 3) Passive eavesdropping without jamming:
in this scheme, the legitimate monitor does not send any
jamming signal, i.e., q(ν) = 0, ∀ν.
In the simulation, we consider Rayleigh fading and set the
channel coefficients h0(ν), h1(ν), and h2(ν) to be independent
CSCG random variables with mean zero and variances 1, 0.1,
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Fig. 3. The eavesdropping non-outage probability
Eν(X(ν)) versus the average jamming power Q at
the legitimate monitor in delay-sensitive suspicious
applications.
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Fig. 4. The relative eavesdropping rate
Eν (r¯0(ν)X(ν))
Eν(r¯0(ν))
versus the average jamming power
Q at the legitimate monitor in delay-tolerant suspi-
cious applications, where the suspicious transmitter
employs the fixed power transmission.
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Fig. 5. The average suspicious communication
rate E(r¯0(ν)) and the average eavesdropping rate
E(r¯0(ν)X(ν))) versus the average jamming power
Q at the legitimate monitor in delay-tolerant suspi-
cious applications, where the suspicious transmitter
employs the fixed power transmission.
and 0.1, respectively, ∀ν, by assuming that the legitimate mon-
itor is far away from the suspicious transmitter and receiver as
compared to their distance. Furthermore, we set the transmit
power at the suspicious transmitter to be P = 20 dB unless
otherwise stated, and the noise powers to be σ20 = σ21 = 1.
Here, the system parameters are normalized without loss of
generality, and can be easily extended to the case with realistic
parameters.
First, consider delay-sensitive suspicious applications. Fig.
3 shows the eavesdropping non-outage probability Eν(X(ν))
versus the average jamming power Q at the legitimate monitor.
It is observed that the proactive eavesdropping (with both
cognitive jamming and constant-power jamming) achieves
higher eavesdropping non-outage probability than the passive
eavesdropping, while the cognitive jamming with optimal
power control outperforms the constant-power jamming.
Next, consider that the suspicious transmitter employs fixed
power transmission in delay-tolerant suspicious applications.
Fig. 4 shows the relative eavesdropping rate Eν(r¯0(ν)X(ν))
Eν(r¯0(ν))
versus the average jamming power Q at the legitimate monitor.
The proactive eavesdropping via cognitive jamming achieves
the best eavesdropping performance in terms of the relative
eavesdropping rate. Furthermore, Fig. 5 shows the average
suspicious communication rate E(r¯0(ν)) and the average
eavesdropping rate E(r¯0(ν)X(ν)), respectively. It is observed
that as compared to the constant-power jamming, the cognitive
jamming with optimal power control achieves higher average
eavesdropping rate. This shows that by utilizing the optimal
cognitive jamming, the legitimate monitor can not only eaves-
drop a higher percentage of data bits but also a larger volume
of data. This validates the advantages of the proposed proactive
eavesdropping via cognitive jamming with the optimal power
control.
In addition, consider the suspicious transmitter employs
water-filling power allocation in delay-tolerant suspicious
applications. Fig. 6 shows the relative eavesdropping rate
Eν(rˆ0(ν)X(ν))
Eν(rˆ0(ν))
versus the average jamming power Q at the
legitimate monitor, and Fig. 7 shows the average suspicious
communication rate E(rˆ0(ν)) and the average eavesdropping
rate E(rˆ0(ν)X(ν)), respectively. The two figures can be
similarly explained as for Figs. 4 and 5, respectively.
Finally, Fig. 8 shows the relative eavesdropping rates versus
the average transmit power P at the suspicious transmitter
in delay-tolerant suspicious applications, where both fixed
power transmission and water-filling power allocation at the
suspicious transmitter are considered. Here, the average jam-
ming power at the legitimate monitor is set to be Q = 20
dB. It is observed that under the same average jamming
power, the relative eavesdropping rate under the fixed power
transmission at the suspicious transmitter is higher than that
under the water-filling power allocation, especially when the
average transmit power P at the suspicious transmitter is
small. This shows that the dynamics of water-filling power
allocation at the suspicious transmitter degrades the proactive
eavesdropping performance at the legitimate monitor, and the
legitimate monitor needs to use higher average jamming power
when the suspicious transmitter adopts water-filling power
allocation to achieve the same performance as that under fixed
power transmission.
VII. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF PROACTIVE
EAVESDROPPING
Preceding sections focused on characterizing the fundamen-
tal information-theoretical limits of proactive eavesdropping
under the assumption with perfect SIC and global CSI at
the legitimate monitor. In this section, we consider a more
practical case with residual SI and local CSI only, and accord-
ingly design an efficient online cognitive jamming scheme,
inspired by the optimal cognitive jamming above. In the
following, we particularly focus on the eavesdropping non-
outage probability maximization problem for delay-sensitive
applications. Similar ideas and analysis can be used to address
the relative eavesdropping rate maximization problems for
delay-tolerant applications, but the details are omitted here
due to space limitation.
A. Eavesdropping Non-Outage Probability Maximization in
the Case with Residual SI
First, we investigate the effect of the residual SI at the legit-
imate monitor by assuming the loop-back channel power gain
from the jamming to the eavesdropping antennas as φ˜(ν) in the
11
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mitter in delay-tolerant suspicious applications.
fading state ν. Suppose that the SIC at the legitimate monitor
achieves an SI reduction of ϕ (in dB). Then, the residual SI in
this fading state is given as φ˜(ν)q(ν)/ϕ = φ(ν)q(ν), where
φ(ν) = φ˜(ν)/ϕ denotes the effective loop-back channel power
gain after SIC. As demonstrated in practical full-duplex radios
[15], jointly using analog and digital SIC methods can achieve
up to 110 dB SI reduction. With the residual SI, the SNR at
the legitimate monitor in (6) can be revised as the following
SINR:
γ˜1(ν) =
g1(ν)p(ν)
φ(ν)q(ν) + σ21
. (41)
In this case, the successful eavesdropping indicator function
in (9) is rewritten as
X˜(ν) =
{
1, if γ˜1(ν) ≥ γ0(ν)
0, otherwise.
(42)
The non-outage eavesdropping non-outage probability maxi-
mization problem (P1) is thus re-expressed as
(P4) : max
{q(ν)≥0}
Eν
(
X˜(ν)
)
s.t. (2).
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 7.1: The optimal solution to problem (P4) is
given as
q∗4(ν) =

g0(ν)σ
2
1−g1(ν)σ
2
0
g1(ν)g2(ν)−g0(ν)φ(ν)
, if g1(ν)g2(ν)− g0(ν)φ(ν) > 0
and 0 <
g0(ν)σ
2
1−g1(ν)σ
2
0
g1(ν)g2(ν)−g0(ν)φ(ν)
< 1
λ∗4
0, otherwise,
(43)
where λ∗4 denotes the optimal dual variable associated with
the constraint (2).
Sketch of Proof: Note that strong duality still holds
between (P4) and its Lagrange dual problem. Therefore, this
proposition can be verified by applying the Lagrange duality
method to solve (P4), similarly as in Proposition 3.1. The
details are omitted here for brevity.
Proposition 7.1 shows that at each fading state ν, if the
eavesdropping link is weaker than the suspicious link (i.e.,
g0(ν)σ
2
1 − g1(ν)σ
2
0 > 0), then the minimum jamming power
for the eavesdropping to be successful is given as q˜∗(ν) ,
g0(ν)σ
2
1−g1(ν)σ
2
0
g1(ν)g2(ν)−g0(ν)φ(ν)
, which is valid only when the residual SI
is not so strong (i.e., g1(ν)g2(ν)− g0(ν)φ(ν) > 0 holds). By
comparing Proposition 3.1 versus Proposition 7.1, we observe
that threshold-based jamming power allocations are optimal
to maximize the eavesdropping non-outage probability in both
cases without and with residual SI, where the jamming power
cannot exceed the thresholds 1
λ∗1
and 1
λ∗4
, respectively.
B. Online Cognitive Jamming Under Practical Assumptions
Inspired by the optimal threshold-based power allocation in
Proposition 7.1, we then consider online cognitive jamming
strategies under the following practical assumptions. First,
instead of considering the case with infinite fading states, we
consider a finite horizon of N time blocks, with wireless
channels being constant over each block. Accordingly, we
use ν ∈ {1, . . . , N} to denote the index of the time block
in this subsection. Next, at each time block, the legitimate
monitor does not know the suspicious channel g0(ν) or
the jamming channel g2(ν), but it knows the eavesdropping
channel g1(ν) and the effective loop-back channel φ(ν) via
channel estimation based on the received signals. Therefore,
it knows the resultant SINR γ˜1(ν) at the itself under any
given jamming power. In addition, under any given jamming
power, the legitimate monitor can infer the resultant suspicious
communication rate r0(ν) in (7) (and accordingly the SINR
γ0(ν) at the legitimate monitor) by analyzing the received
signals from the suspicious transmitter.
Under this setup, we propose an online cognitive jamming
scheme by separating each time block into two phases: one for
learning the required jamming power q˜∗(ν) at that time block,
and the other for eavesdropping information. In the following,
we first discuss how to learn q˜∗(ν) at the first phase, and then
present the design of the thresholds and the corresponding
jamming powers over time for the second phase.
1) Learning the Required Jamming Power: At the first
phase of each time block, the legitimate monitor estimates the
required jamming power q˜∗(ν) = g0(ν)σ21−g1(ν)σ20
g1(ν)g2(ν)−g0(ν)φ(ν)
. At the
first glance, this is a very difficult task as it does not know the
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TABLE II
ALGORITHM FOR THE ONLINE THRESHOLD-BASED JAMMING
• Initialization: set the initial threshold as τ(1).
• For ν = 1, . . . , N
– Jamming power design: if q˜∗(ν) ≤ τ(ν), we have
qonline(ν) = q˜
∗(ν); otherwise, it follows that qonline(ν) = 0;
– Threshold update: if 1
ν
∑
ν
i=1 qonline(ν) < Q, we have τ(ν+
1) = τ(ν) + χ; otherwise, τ(ν + 1) = τ(ν)− χ.
• End for
channels g0(ν) and g2(ν) at that time block. Fortunately, under
any given jamming power employed, the legitimate monitor
is able to know the resultant SINRs γ˜1(ν) at the legitimate
monitor and γ0(ν) at the suspicious receiver. As a result, the
legitimate monitor knows whether the currently used jamming
power is larger or smaller than q˜∗(ν). In this case, by adjusting
the jamming power based on a bisection manner, the legitimate
monitor is able to find q˜∗(ν) at that time block.
Note that in general, longer learning time results in more
accurate estimation of q˜∗(ν) in the first phase, but reduces
the length of the second phase for eavesdropping information.
Therefore, there exists a tradeoff in designing the length of
the two phases to optimize the eavesdropping performance,
especially when the wireless channels fluctuate fast (e.g., due
to the mobility of suspicious transmitter and receiver) and each
time block is with a finite length. In this section, we consider
that each time block is sufficiently long and thus the time
consumed for estimation in the first phase is negligible.
2) Online Threshold-Based Jamming Design: After q˜∗(ν)
is obtained, we propose a practical online threshold-based
cognitive jamming design, inspired by the optimal cognitive
jamming solution in Proposition 7.1. In particular, at each time
block ν, the legitimate monitor updates a threshold τ(ν) and
accordingly obtains the online jamming power as qonline(ν) =
q˜∗(ν) when the required jamming power q˜∗(ν) is no larger
than the threshold τ(ν), and qonline(ν) = 0 otherwise. Further-
more, at each time block ν, if the average jamming power so
far (i.e., 1
ν
∑ν
i=1 qonline(ν)) is less than the maximum average
power Q, we increase τ(ν +1) as τ(ν +1) = τ(ν) +χ so as
to jam over more blocks subsequently; otherwise, we decrease
τ(ν+1) as τ(ν+1) = τ(ν)−χ. Here, χ > 0 denotes a constant
step size that is a design parameter. To summarize, we list the
detailed algorithm in Table II.
It is worth noting that in the proposed online threshold-
based cognitive jamming, the threshold τ(ν)’s will converge
to the optimal threshold 1/λ∗4 if the step size χ is sufficiently
small and the number of time blocks N is sufficiently large.
This is due to the fact that at each time block the value
of 1
ν−1
∑ν−1
i=1 ponline(ν) − Q can be viewed as a good ap-
proximation of the subgradient of the dual problem of (P4),
and therefore, the sequence of 1/τ(ν)’s will converge to the
optimal dual variable λ∗4.
C. Numerical Examples
We conduct simulations to illustrate the effect of residual
SI and show the performance of our proposed online cognitive
jamming design under a practical setup with N = 105 time
blocks. In the simulations, we consider the suspicious trans-
mitter and the suspicious receiver are located at (0, 0) and (500
meters, 0), respectively. We consider Rayleigh fading channel
model, where the pathloss is assumed to be ι(d/d0)−κ, with
ι = −60 dB at a reference distance of d0 = 10 meters, and
the pathloss exponent is κ = 3. Here, d denotes the distance
between a transmitter and a receiver. Furthermore, we consider
the SIC capability at the legitimate monitor to be ϕ = 110 dB
[15]. For the practical online cognitive jamming, we set the
initial threshold as τ(1) = 2Q, and the step size as Q/1000.
In addition, we set the noise powers as σ20 = σ21 = −80 dBm,
and the transmit power at the suspicious transmitter as P = 40
dBm.
First, consider that the jamming and eavesdropping antennas
of the legitimate monitor are co-located at (500 meters, 500
meters), where the loop-back channel power gain is assumed
to be φ˜(ν) = −15 dB, ∀ν (with the distance between the
eavesdropping and jamming antennas being a half wavelength)
[30]. Fig. 9 shows the thresholds 1/λ∗4 by the optimal jamming
and τ(ν) by the practical online jamming, where Q = 30 dBm.
It is observed that the threshold under practical online jamming
converges to a similar value as the one under the optimal
jamming, though it fluctuates over time due to the relatively
large step size employed. Fig. 10 shows the eavesdropping
non-outage probability versus the average jamming power Q.
It is observed that our proposed online jamming (with SI)
achieves close performances to the optimal jamming (with
SI), which shows the effectiveness of our online threshold
adaptation and jamming power design. The online jamming
is also observed to significantly outperform other benchmark
schemes including constant-power jamming, on-off jamming,
and passive jamming. Furthermore, the performance achieved
by the optimal jamming with SI is inferior to that without SI,
especially when the average jamming power is larger than 30
dBm. Such a performance loss is due to the residual SI that
is significant at the co-located legitimate monitor.
Next, consider that the eavesdropping and jamming antennas
of the legitimate monitor are separately located at (250 meters,
500 meters) and (500 meters, 500 meters), respectively. Fig.
11 shows the eavesdropping non-outage probability versus
the average jamming power Q. Due to the effectiveness of
SIC in this case, the optimal jamming with SI is observed
to perform the same as that without SI. Furthermore, the
proposed online jamming with SI is observed to have a similar
performance as that of optimal jamming, and achieves much
higher eavesdropping non-outage probability than the other
benchmark schemes.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper proposes a new proactive eavesdropping via
cognitive jamming approach for a legitimate monitor to ef-
ficiently intercept a point-to-point suspicious communication
link in fading channels. Under ideal assumptions of perfect
SIC and global CSI and by considering both delay-sensitive
and delay-tolerant suspicious applications, we formulate opti-
mization problems to maximize the eavesdropping non-outage
probability and the relative eavesdropping rate at the legiti-
mate monitor, respectively, by optimizing its jamming power
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allocation subject to an average jamming power constraint.
Despite the non-convexity of these problems, we obtain their
optimal solutions by utilizing the Lagrange duality method.
Numerical results show that our proposed proactive eaves-
dropping via cognitive jamming can significantly improve
the eavesdropping performance as compared to conventional
heuristics. Our proposed proactive eavesdropping design is
also extended to the practical case with residual SI and local
CSI only. We hope that this paper can provide a new paradigm
for designing legitimate surveillance in emerging wireless
communication networks. Due to the space limitation, there
are various important issues that are unaddressed in this paper.
We briefly discuss them in the following to motivate future
studies.
First, in the future the suspicious users may be intel-
ligent and be able to detect the legitimate monitor (see,
e.g., [31]), deploy more antennas, and even utilize advanced
physical-layer security techniques (aided by the artificial noise
[32]) to defend against the eavesdropping attack. These anti-
eavesdropping techniques can be viewed as the countermea-
sure of the wireless information surveillance. Modeling and
analyzing their interplay, e.g., via game theory [33], are
interesting open problems.
Next, in practical wireless networks there may exist massive
suspicious users each with more than one antennas, and they
may adapt the transmit beamformers to defend against the
eavesdropping. To ensure the successful eavesdropping in
this case, we may need a large number of multi-antenna
legitimate monitors with either separate or co-located eaves-
dropping/jamming antennas. How to select the mode (i.e.,
eavesdropping or jamming) for each antenna at different
legitimate monitors, and coordinate the eavesdropping and
jamming design at different antennas is an interesting problem
worth pursuing in the future work.
Furthermore, to approach the proactive eavesdropping per-
formance upper bound (beyond the online jamming), it is
critical for the legitimate monitor to obtain the global CSI
(especially the CSI of the suspicious link). Some channel
learning ideas in cognitive radio and energy-based feedback
(see, e.g., [34]–[37]) may be borrowed for the legitimate
monitor to learn the CSI of the suspicious link.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 3.1
We prove Proposition 3.1 by using the Lagrange duality
method. Let λ ≥ 0 denote the dual variable associated with
the average jamming power constraint in (2). Then the partial
Lagrangian of problem (P1) is expressed as
L1({q(ν)}, λ) = Eν(X(ν))− λ (Eν(q(ν)) −Q) . (44)
Define the dual function as
f1(λ) = max
{q(ν)≥0}
L1({q(ν)}, λ). (45)
Accordingly, the dual problem of (P1) is given by
(D1) : min
λ≥0
f1(λ). (46)
Since strong duality holds between (P1) and its dual prob-
lem (D1), we solve (P1) by equivalently solving (D1). In
particular, we first solve problem (45) to obtain f1(λ) under
any given λ and then solve problem (D1) to find the optimal
λ, denoted by λ∗1.
First, consider problem (45) under any given λ ≥ 0.
By discarding the constant term λQ, problem (45) can be
decomposed into a sequence of subproblems as follows each
for one fading state ν.
max
q(ν)≥0
X(ν)− λq(ν) (47)
We solve problem (47) by considering the two cases when(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
≤ 0 and
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
> 0,
respectively. When
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
≤ 0, it always holds
that X(ν) = 1 provided that q(ν) ≥ 0, and thus problem (47)
becomes maxq(ν)≥0 1−λq(ν), for which the optimal solution
is q(λ)1 = 0.
On the other hand, when
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
> 0, prob-
lem (47) is solved by comparing the optimal values under the
following two subcases.
Subcase 1: X(ν) = 1 or equivalently q(ν) ≥(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
. In this case, problem (47) becomes
max
q(ν)≥
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21−σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
1−λq(ν), for which the solution
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is q(ν) =
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
, and the resulting optimal
value is 1− λ
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
.
Subcase 2: X(ν) = 0 or equivalently q(ν) <(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
. In this case, problem (47) becomes
max
0≤q(ν)<
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21−σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
−λq(ν), for which the solution
is q(ν) = 0, and the corresponding optimal value is 0.
By comparing the two subcases, we have
that if 1 − λ
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
> 0, then
q
(λ)
1 =
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
; otherwise, q(λ)1 = 0. By
summarizing the above two cases, the optimal solution to
problem (47) is given as
q
(λ)
1 (ν) ={ (
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
, if 0 <
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
< 1
λ
,
0, otherwise.
(48)
Therefore, the dual function f1(λ) has been obtained.
Next, we solve the dual problem (D1) to find the optimal λ∗1
via the bisection method by using the fact that the subgradient
of f1(λ) is indeed s1(λ) = Q − Eν(q(λ)1 (ν)) under any
given λ ≥ 0. By substituting the optimal λ∗1 into (48), then
the optimal solution to (P1) is given as {q∗1(ν)} in (13).
Note that if Eν
((
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
)
< Q, then we have
s1(λ) > 0, ∀λ ≥ 0. In this case, we have λ∗ → 0 and the
optimal solution degrades to (14). Otherwise, λ∗1 is set such
that s1(λ∗1) = Q− Eν(q∗1(ν)) = 0. Therefore, the proposition
is finally proved.
B. Proof of Proposition 4.1
First, we prove the ‘if’ part. Let {q(ν)} be a feasible
solution set, then for any µ ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0, it follows that
f2(µ, λ) ≥ L2({q(ν)}, µ, λ) ≥ 0. Then if there exist µ ≥ 0
and λ ≥ 0 such that f2(µ, λ) < 0, then problem (P2.2) is
infeasible and µ and λ are one certificate of infeasibility.
Next, we prove the ‘only if’ part. Consider a given λ > 0,
and define the following problem.
max
{q(ν)}
λ (Q− Eν(q(ν))) (49)
s.t. (16) and (11)
Note that problem (49) is always feasible for any 0 ≤ t ≤ 1,
via the legitimate monitor setting its jamming power to be
sufficiently large, e.g., q(ν) → ∞, ∀ν. Let the optimal solu-
tion to problem (49) be denoted by {q(ν)}. Since problem
(P2.2) is infeasible, it follows that Eν(q(ν)) > Q and thus
λ
(
Q− Eν(q(ν))
)
< 0. Furthermore, note that strong duality
holds for problem (49) since it satisfies the time-sharing
condition. By letting µ denote the dual variable associated
with the constraint (16) in problem (49), then it is easy
to show that there exists a dual variable µ ≥ 0 such that
max{q(ν)≥0} L2({q(ν)}, µ, λ) = L2({q(ν)}, µ, λ) < 0. As
a consequence, we have f2(µ, λ) = L2({q(ν)}, µ, λ) < 0.
Equivalently, there exist µ ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 0 such that
f2(µ, λ) < 0. Therefore, this proposition follows immediately.
C. Proof of Proposition 4.2
First, we consider the case when
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
≤ 0.
In this case, it always holds that X(ν) = 1 provided that
q(ν) ≥ 0. As a result, problem (20) becomes
max
q(ν)≥0
µ(1− t)r0(ν) − λq(ν),
for which the optimal solution is q(µ,λ)2 (ν) = 0.
Next, we consider the other case when(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
> 0. In this case, problem (20)
is solved by comparing the optimal values under the two
subcases when X(ν) = 1 and X(ν) = 0, respectively.
Subcase 1: X(ν) = 1 or equivalently q(ν) ≥(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
. In this subcase, problem (20) becomes
max
q(ν)≥
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21−σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
µ (1− t) r0(ν)−λq(ν), for which
the solution is q(ν) =
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
, and the resultant
optimal value is given as v1(ν) in (23).
Subcase 2: X(ν) = 0 or equivalently q(ν) <(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
. In this subcase, problem (20) becomes
max
q(ν)
− µtr0(ν) − λq(ν)
s.t. 0 ≤ q(ν) <
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
. (50)
Note that r0(ν) is a convex function in q(ν) ≥ 0. As a result,
problem (50) is a convex optimization problem. By using the
standard convex optimization technique, the optimal solution
to problem (50) is given as q(ν) = q¯(ν) in (22) and the
resulting optimal value is expressed as v2(ν) in (24). Note that
in the case with q¯(ν) =
(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
, the solution
q(ν) = q¯(ν) here cannot be exactly achieved due to the strict
power inequality constraint in problem (50). Nevertheless, this
would not affect the solution to (20), since in this case the
optimal value v2(ν) here is always smaller than that in the
subcase 1, i.e., v1(ν).
By comparing the optimal values v1(ν) and v2(ν),
the optimal solution q(µ,λ)2 (ν) in the case when(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
> 0 can be obtained. By using
this together with the solution q(µ,λ)2 (ν) = 0 in the case with(
g0(ν)
g1(ν)
σ21 − σ
2
0
)
1
g2(ν)
≤ 0, the optimal solution to problem
(20) is finally given in (21). Therefore, this proposition is
proved.
D. Checking the Feasibility of Problem (28)
Let the dual variables associated with the constraints in (2)
and (26) be denoted by λ ≥ 0 and ζ, respectively. Then the
partial Lagrangian of problem (28) is denoted as
Lˆ({q(ν)}, λ, ζ) = −λ (Eν(q(ν)) −Q)− ζ (Eν (pˆ(ν))− P ) .
(51)
As a result, the dual function of (P2.2) is expressed as
fˆ(λ, ζ) = max
{q(ν)≥0}
Lˆ({q(ν)}, λ, ζ). (52)
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The dual problem is accordingly written as minλ≥0,ζ fˆ(λ, ζ).
Based on Lemma 5.1, we check the feasibility of problem
(28) by solving its dual problem. Similar to Proposition 4.1, we
have the following proposition, for which the proof is omitted
for brevity.
Proposition A.1: Problem (28) is infeasible if and only if
there exist λ ≥ 0 and ζ such that fˆ(λ, ζ) < 0.
In addition, we have the optimal solution to problem (52)
given in the following proposition.
Proposition A.2: The optimal solution to problem (52) is
given as
q(λ,ζ)(ν) =
{
qˆ1(ν), if −
ζ
ln 2·β +
ζσ20
g0(ν)
≤ −λqˆ1(ν)
0, otherwise,
(53)
where qˆ1(ν) ,
[
g0(ν)
ln 2·βg2(ν)
−
σ20
g2(ν)
]+
, ∀ν.
Proof: Problem (52) can be decomposed into various
subproblems as follows each for one fading state ν.
max
q(ν)≥0
− λq(ν)− ζpˆ(ν) (54)
When q(ν) ≥ qˆ1(ν), problem (54) becomes maxq(ν)≥qˆ1(ν) −
λq(ν), for which the optimal solution is q(ν) = qˆ1(ν) and the
resulting optimal value is −λqˆ1(ν). On the other hand, when
q(ν) < qˆ1(ν), problem (54) becomes max0≤q(ν)<qˆ1(ν) −
λq(ν)− ζ
(
1
ln 2·β −
g2(ν)q(ν)+σ
2
0
g0(ν)
)
. The objective values under
q(ν) = 0 and q(ν) = qˆ1(ν) are given as −ζ 1ln 2·β +
ζσ20
g0(ν)
and −λqˆ1(ν), respectively. As a result, by comparing them,
we have the optimal solution to problem (54) as given in (53).
Therefore, Proposition A.2 is verified.
Based on Propositions A.1 and A.2, we can efficiently check
the feasibility of problem (28) by using the ellipsoid method
by using the fact that the subgradient of fˆ(λ, ζ) is given
by sˆ(λ, ζ) =
[
Q− Eν(q
(λ,ζ)(ν)), P − Eν
(
pˆ(λ,ζ)(ν)
)]T
,
where {pˆ(λ,ζ)(ν)} denotes the corresponding {pˆ(ν)} in (25)
under given {q(λ,ζ)(ν)}.
E. Proof of Proposition 5.2
Note that by discarding the constant λQ+ζP , problem (31)
can be equivalent decomposed into various subproblems in the
following, each of which is for one fading state ν.
max
q(ν)≥0
µ(X(ν)− t)rˆ0(ν)− λq(ν) − ζpˆ(ν) (55)
For each fading state ν, problem (55) is solved by considering
three cases.
Consider the first case when q(ν) ≥ qˆ1(ν), in which we
have rˆ0(ν) = 0 and pˆ(ν) = 0. Accordingly, problem (55)
becomes maxq(ν)≥qˆ1(ν) − λq(ν), for which the optimal
solution and the resulting optimal value are q(ν) = qˆ1(ν) in
(34) and vˆ1(ν) in (38), respectively.
Next, consider the second case with q(ν) < qˆ1(ν) and
X(ν) = 1 (or equivalently q(ν) ≥ qˆ2(ν) with qˆ2(ν) given
in (35)). In this case, problem (55) becomes
max
q(ν)
µ(1− t) log2
(
g0(ν)
ln 2 · β(g2(ν)q(ν) + σ20)
)
− λq(ν)
− ζ
(
1
ln 2 · β
−
g2(ν)q(ν) + σ
2
0
g0(ν)
)
s.t. qˆ2(ν) ≤ q(ν) < qˆ1(ν). (56)
Note that problem (56) is feasible only when qˆ2(ν) < qˆ1(ν).
Furthermore, the objective function of problem (56) is convex
as a function of q(ν). As a result, its optimal solution is either
q(ν) = qˆ2(ν) or q(ν) = qˆ1(ν). When q(ν) = qˆ1(ν), the
objective value is vˆ1(ν) in (38), while when q(ν) = qˆ2(ν),
the objective value is vˆ2(ν) in (39).
In addition, consider the third case with q(ν) < qˆ1(ν) and
X(ν) = 0 (or equivalently q(ν) < qˆ2(ν). In this case, problem
(55) becomes
max
q(ν)
− tµ log2
(
g0(ν)
ln 2 · β(g2(ν)q(ν) + σ20)
)
− λq(ν)
− ζ
(
1
ln 2 · β
−
g2(ν)q(ν) + σ
2
0
g0(ν)
)
s.t. 0 ≤ q(ν) < min(qˆ1(ν), qˆ2(ν)), (57)
which is a convex optimization problem. It can be shown
that the first-order derivative of the objective function of
problem (57) achieves zero value when qˆ4(ν) in (37). As
a result, the optimal solution to problem (57) is given as
qˆ3(ν) = [min(qˆ1(ν), qˆ2(ν), qˆ4(ν))]
+
as given in (36)), and
the resulting optimal value is given as vˆ3(ν) in (40).
By comparing the obtained values vˆ1(ν), vˆ2(ν), and vˆ3(ν)
in the above three cases, together with the fact that vˆ2(ν) is
achievable (i.e., problem (56) is feasible) only when qˆ2(ν) <
qˆ1(ν), we can obtain the optimal solution to problem (55).
Therefore, this proposition is proved.
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